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Stephen Tierney: The Scottish
Constitution After Independence
According to the Scottish Government White Paper issued
this week, Scotland’s Future, an independent Scotland
will have a new written constitution (this repeats the
commitment contained in the Scottish Government’s
earlier White Paper of March). The intention is to replace
Westminster parliamentary supremacy with the
‘sovereignty of the people of Scotland’ since, the
Government claims, popular sovereignty has historically been ‘the central
principle in the Scottish constitutional tradition.’ While this latter claim may
be questionable, the commitment to a written constitution does promise a
significant constitutional break with the Westminster tradition and a new
constitutional culture for Scotland.
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In this blog I will briefly discuss three matters:
When will the proposed constitution be drafted and
promulgated?
What will it contain?
How will it be drafted?
When will Scotland have a new constitution?: The short answer is,
we don’t know exactly. The task of drafting a new constitution will not
commence until after the Scottish Parliament elections scheduled for 5 May
2016, some six weeks after Independence Day, set for 24 March. The White
Paper does not offer a view as to how long the drafting process is likely to
take and therefore we have no provisional date for the eventual
promulgation of a new constitution.
What will it contain?: There is something of a tension between the
substantive constitutional proposals put forward in the White Paper and the
process by which it will be drafted.
The Scottish Government offers a fairly extensive list of what it thinks the
constitution should contain, and a number of these provisions are key to its
vision for independence. For example:
equality of opportunity and entitlement to live free of
discrimination and prejudice
entitlement to public services and to a standard of living that, as
a minimum, secures dignity and self-respect and provides the
opportunity for people to realise their full potential both as
individuals and as members of wider society
protection of the environment and the sustainable use of
Scotland’s natural resources to embed Scotland’s commitment to
sustainable development and tackling climate change
a ban on nuclear weapons being based in Scotland
controls on the use of military force and a role for an
independent Scottish Parliament in approving and monitoring its
use
the existence and status of local government
rights in relation to healthcare, welfare and pensions
children’s rights
rights concerning other social and economic matters, such as the
right to education and a Youth Guarantee on employment,
education or training
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Another proposal is that Scotland would remain a constitutional monarchy
‘for as long as the people of Scotland wish us to be so’. In relation to a
number of these proposed rights, such as the opportunity of education,
training or employment and rights to welfare support and health care, there
is no commitment that these would be legally enforceable by courts but
rather the more vague suggestion that they will be ‘questions of social justice
at the forefront of the work of Scotland’s Parliament, government and public
institutions.’
But in any case, since the Government does not propose to draft the
constitution itself, each of these is merely a proposal for consideration. As
we turn to the proposed process by which the constitution will be drafted we
find that there is no guarantee that any of these commitments will in fact
find their way into a new constitution.
Drafting the Constitution: A Scottish Constitutional Convention?
The White Paper provides that, following the elections of May 2016, a
constitutional convention will be established to ‘prepare the written
constitution’. But how can it be so sure? There is no guarantee the SNP will
win the 2016 elections and another party or parties forming the government
at that time may have different views about this.
The Scottish Government seeks to deal with this by way of some form of
constitutional guarantee or entrenchment: ‘The constitutional platform,
along with the refreshed Scotland Act, will be the founding legislation of an 
independent Scotland and will not be subject to significant alteration
pending the preparation of a permanent constitution by the constitutional
convention’. It is stated in the White Paper that, during the transitional stage
between the referendum and Independence Day on 24 March, legislation
will be passed placing a duty on the Scottish Parliament elected in 2016 to
establish a constitutional convention. It is not clear by whom this legislation
will be passed although it does seem that the goal is either for concurrent
legislation of the UK and Scottish Parliaments or for the Westminster
Parliament to transfer power to the Scottish Parliament for this purpose.
Even so, this raises an interesting question as to whether the 2016
Parliament would be bound by such legislation. There would of course be no
written constitution in place to restrict its powers. Would it be bound by the
sovereignty of Westminster? Surely not, as the newly elected Parliament of
an independent country. This issue is worthy of more detailed consideration
in due course and important lessons may well be found from comparative
cases.
Assuming that the Scottish Parliament does assume the role as convener of a
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constitutional convention in 2016, what will this convention look like?
Perhaps not surprisingly at this stage the White Paper offers little in the way
of detail. But all the same important questions remain to be asked. We are
told that the convention will be ‘open, participative and inclusive’ and that
the new constitution ‘should be designed by the people of Scotland, for the
people of Scotland’. But is the proposed convention likely to be a genuinely
popular process?
In one passage the White Paper states: ‘International best practice and the
practical experience of other countries and territories should be considered
and taken into account in advance of the determination of the process for
the constitutional convention. In the last decade, citizen-led assemblies and
constitutional conventions have been convened in British Columbia (2004),
the Netherlands (2006), Ontario (2007) and Iceland (2010). Since 2012,
Ireland has been holding a citizen-led constitutional convention to review
various constitutional issues.’ From a number of these examples it is clear
that citizens can be engaged directly and in meaningful ways in drafting
important constitutional provisions. But is this what the White Paper
proposes? In fact this passage is juxtaposed with the suggestion that the
constitutional convention ‘will ensure a participative and inclusive process
where the people of Scotland, as well as politicians, civic society
organisations, business interests, trade unions, local authorities and others,
will have a direct role in shaping the constitution.’
This raises the question: will the process really be a popular and meaningful
engagement with citizens, or will it be a largely elite-led event, like the
Scottish Constitutional Convention from 1989-1995? Will in fact the new
constitution be drafted by elites – politicians, civic society organisations,
business interests, trade unions and local authorities? If so, is this
satisfactory? After all, of these groups only politicians are elected by the
citizens of Scotland. To whom are the other organisations accountable and
in what ways? Who would select members of these groups to sit on the
convention, on what basis, and with what degree of decision-making power
would they be vested? The reference to ‘civic society organisations’
introduces a risk that pressure groups with fixed agendas and well-oiled
activism machinery could hijack the process, arguing persuasively for the
entrenchment in the new constitution of their own particular priorities,
priorities which may not have the support of a plurality of citizens.
Such an approach to constitutional drafting runs counter to some of the
other examples cited in the White Paper. The Citizens’ Assemblies in British
Columbia and Ontario, for example, were composed of citizens selected
randomly from the electoral role. This was a direct attempt to take
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constitutional decision-making out of the hands of elites, be they politicians
or members of the fabled ‘civil society’.
Another question is: what power will such a convention, whether popular or
elite, have? The White Paper says it will ‘prepare’ the constitution. Does that
mean it will have the authority to present a final version of the constitution
for ratification? Or would its role be advisory only, subject to change by the
Scottish Parliament?
It seems that the convention is intended to have real determining power.
That the Scottish  Government can only ‘propose [certain matters] for
consideration’ by the constitutional convention suggests that the convention
will have control over the inclusion or exclusion of all of the Government’s
goals outlined above, including the personality of the head of state.
However, there seems to be one exception here. According to the White
Paper the convention will itself be limited in its remit by at least one
substantive precondition: ‘Key equality and human rights principles,
including the requirements of the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR), would be embedded in the written constitution.’ This seems to be a
non-negotiable commitment which the convention could not override. In
other words, the convention will not be able to give effect to the ECHR in a
way comparable to sections 3 and 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998, leaving
the last word to the Scottish Parliament, a power which Westminster
currently enjoys. There is also the suggestion that legislation during the
transition period will give the ECHR the same legal force for reserved
matters as it already has for devolved matters. Both these transitional
arrangements and the constitutional pre-commitment on the ECHR in turn
make the supremacy of judges over the new Scottish Parliament in the
human rights area another de facto pre-commitment. Of course it may be
that a constitutional convention or citizens’ assembly would come to the
view that this is good for Scotland, but surely that should be left to this
process to determine?
Finally, how would the constitution be promulgated? Would it simply need
the ratification of the Scottish Parliament, or would there be a referendum?
The White Paper does not say, but given the growth in referendums within
our constitutional practice it seems inconceivable that such a momentous
constitutional development, intended to declare the sovereignty of the
Scottish people, could take place without the express authorship of the
people expressed in a referendum.
Stephen Tierney is Professor of Constitutional Theory at the University of
Edinburgh and Director of the Edinburgh Centre for Constitutional Law.
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 He is currently ESRC Senior Research Fellow under the Future of the UK
and Scotland programme. I am grateful to Katie Boyle for research
assistance in writing this blog.
Suggested citation: S.Tierney, ‘The Scottish Constitution After Independence
’  (2nd December 2013) (available at http://ukconstitutionallaw.org).
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This is an important and powerful post from Stephen. The question of a
second referendum has not been properly considered by the Scottish
Government. As Stephen argues, a referendum on a new constitution is
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now common practice in many territories. It would be surprising if such
a vote were not held in Scotland. It might also be worth remembering
that there was a suggestion that a referendum should also be held on the
result of the negotiations between the UK and Scottish representatives
over the terms of independence. Furthermore, Neil Walker – in a
seminar run by the Scottish Constitutional Futures Forum – has also
noted that it is common for new states seeking accession to the EU to
hold a referendum on that, too.
So we have three issues, closely tied together, each of which suggest a
second referendum might be a good idea. Could it be argued that these
should be combined? Having voted yes to independence, perhaps
following negotiations with the UK, the EU, and the drafting of a new
constitution, a second referendum should be held to establish the
constitutional base of a new Scottish state?
Nick Barber
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John Lubran
December 3, 2013 at 5:52 pm
There continues to be a commonly held belief, amongst ‘professional’
commentators, in constitutional law fictions. The academic fraternity are
mired in these baseless conditioned reflexes. It seems that to obtain a
PhD in constitutional law one must first leave common sense and
common law outside of the false premise on which most such academic
argument rely.
There are some fundamental realties about constitutions and the first is
that any constitution simply drawn up by politicians and powerful elites
and ratified by a show of hands in their parliament is not a constitutional
instrument; they are mere statutes. The only way to create a
constitutional instrument is through a very clear, fully informed and
overwhelming consensus of the population affected; it’s a very big job, it
can’t be rushed, it will take a very long time. The one it proposes to
overthrow has taken centuries to form. This is not Egypt.
Creating a new constitution in an advanced liberal democracy such as
Scotland (the term liberal in this context having nothing to do with any
liberal party), is a very big task. But let us first consider the fact that
Scotland already has its own constitution in the same way that England
has its own too. Certainly written if not codified into a single handy
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document. Scotland is one of that special group of countries whose
constitutional law is based on common law, the ‘little parliaments’ of
juries and higher court precedents on the one hand and contractual
constitutional instruments on the other, all under the sovereignty of a
Constitutional Monarch as opposed to the legal fiction of the sovereignty
of politicians, who by their very power hungry nature would love nothing
more than to have Napoleons civil code supreme on these islands. As
things stand, throughout Britain, politicians cannot make laws, which is
the fundamental myth subscribed to by too many academics. Politicians
make statute legislation that must follow law to have any legitimacy. This
is not arcane, though it does appear to be hidden in plain sight.
Politicians and their familiars have been trying to usurp the supremacy of
common law and constutution since the perversely unconstitutional
1911Parliament Act. Astonishingly there is nothing in law that enables
them to do this; it has been achieved by the cap doffing ignorant
acquiescence of earlier populations. It simply won’t do today because
there will be unchallengeable opposition to allowing mere politicians to
decide on any constitutional agreements without a full and inclusive
consultation of a sort almost never undertaken by them even though they
often erroneously describe their processes as such.
The list of provisions ‘offered’ by the Scottish Parliament in Stephens
article are typical of weasel worded snake oil salesmen, of course these
basic provisions for decency must be provided, but who the heck do they
think they are? Nothing in these so called ‘offered’ provisions is not
already properly provided for in Scotland’s exiting constitutional law.
The deceit of this ‘offer’ is that by creating this so called new constitution
authority will be shifted from common law to politicians. It may merely
look like shallow and naive politicians overstepping themselves but
conspiracy theorists will have a field day pointing out its more sinister
aspects.
Scotland is not a banana republic. High handedness by political cartels
and their apologists in academia who seeks to transfer sovereignty from
Law to hastily drawn up statutes will only end in tears.
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